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The primary objective of this paper is to summarize and review extant literature concerning Fischer tax 
compliance model for a dual purpose. Firstly, the Fischer tax compliance model provides a framework 
for understanding the influence of those socio-economic and psychological components on tax payers’ 
compliance decision. We suggest a partial refinement to this model by incorporating another important 
environmental factor - culture and the interaction effect between noncompliance opportunity and tax 
system/structure on tax compliance. Secondly, the review enables us to synthesize this topic so as to 
help researchers identify those gaps and consider promising future directions for further study.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Tax evasion is a universal phenomenon that takes place 
in all societies and economic systems including both 
developed and developing countries. In the US, it is 
estimated that the extent of tax gap (the difference 
between taxes owed and taxed filed) for 2001 were US$ 
353 billion (IRS, 2006). This concern is particularly severe 
for developing countries given the rapid growth of 
investment in their economies and their lack of adequate 
experience in dealing with this problem. In China, the tax 
evasion by multinationals resulted in revenue loss 
amounted to US$ 3.88 billion each year (Asia Times, April 
11 2007). In Hong Kong, the Inland revenue department 
reported that about US $ 1.15 billion was collected from 
2003 - 07 back tax and penalties (IRD, 2007).   
Thus, tax compliance is growing international concerns 
for tax authorities and public policy makers as tax evasion 
seriously threatens the capacity of government to raise 
public revenue.  
Because of the significance of this issue, tax com-
pliance determinants based on Fischer model(Fischer et 
al., 1992) have been an important subject of research in 
developed countries over the past couple of years  (e.g. 
Andreoni et al., 1998; Ritsema et al., 2003; Houston and 
Tran, 2001; Richardson, 2006). So far, there has been no  
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comprehensive review of the literature related to this 
issue so as to refine the Fischer model and identify those 
gaps for future research areas. Thus, the primary 
objective of this paper is to summarize and review extant 
literature concerning Fischer tax compliance model for a 
dual purpose, firstly, the Fischer tax compliance model 
provides a framework for understanding the influence of 
those socio-economic and psychological components on 
taxpayers’ compliance decision. We suggest a partial 
refinement to this model by incorporating another 
important environmental factor - culture and the inter-
action effect between non-compliance opportunity and tax 
system/structure on tax compliance. Secondly, the review 
enables us to synthesize this topic so as to help resear-
chers identify those gaps and consider promising future 
directions for further study.  
 
 
FISCHER MODEL 
 
Jackson and Milliron (1986) carry out a comprehensive 
review of the tax compliance literature and identify 14 key 
factors that have been studied by researcher on tax 
compliance. These factors are categorized by Fischer 
and associates (Fischer et al., 1992) into 4 groups in his 
expanded model (Fischer Model): (ii) demographic (e.g.-
age, gender and education) (ii) noncompliance oppor-
tunity (e.g. income level, income source and occupation), 
(iii) attitudes   and  perceptions  (e.g.  fairness  of  the  tax  
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Figure 1. Fisher et al. (1992) tax compliance model. 
 
 
system and peer influence) and (iv) tax system/structure 
(e.g. complexity of the tax system, probability of detection 
and penalties and tax rates). Thus Fisher model of tax 
compliance incorporates economic, sociological and 
psychological factors into a comprehensive one. The 
Fisher model is illustrated in Figure 1 and elaborated in 
the following sections. 
 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIALES 
 
The relationship between demographic variables and tax 
compliance has long been of interest (Tittle, 1980). 3 
major personal characteristics for which there is evidence 
of a relationship are age, gender and education (Jackson 
and Milliron, 1986). The Fischer model suggests that de-
mographic variables indirectly affect taxpayer compliance 
by their impacts on noncompliance opportunities and 
attitudes and perceptions.   
 
 
Age 
 
A common demographic variable is the taxpayers’ age. A 
positive link between age and taxpayer compliance is 
reported (Jackson and Milliron, 1986). In addition, data 
coming from the taxpayer compliance measurement 
program (TCMP) of the internal revenue service also 
indicate that “noncompliance is significantly less common 
and of lower magnitude among householders in which 
either the head or the head’s spouse is over age 65” 
(Andreoni et al., 1998). In general, young taxpayers are 
more willing to take risks and are less sensitive to 
sanctions. Based on the 1997 Arkansas tax penalty 
amnesty program, Ritsema et al. (2003) also find that age 
is a factor for intentional evaders, with younger taxpayers 
less complaint. 
 
 
Gender 
 
Early research (Tittle, 1980) testing the tax compliance 
level of males versus females reports that females are 
more likely to tax compliance. Traditionally, “females have 
been identified with conforming roles, moral restraints 
and more conservative life pattern” (Jackson and Milliron, 
1986). All these attributes may promote higher tax com-
pliance. Experimental study conducted by Baldry (1987) 
also finds that females tend to tax compliance by more 
than males do. Jackson and Jaouen (1989) also reveal a 
significant gender difference by treatment group from a 
pool of potential jurors. However, the study by Houston 
and Tran (2001) indicates a higher proportion of tax 
evasion committed by women than men.  
 
 
Education 
 
Education, as a demographic variable relates to the 
taxpayers’ ability to comprehend and comply or not 
comply with the tax laws (Jackson and Milliron, 1986). 2 
aspects of education have been distinguished: “the 
general degree of fiscal knowledge and the degree of 
knowledge involving evasion opportunities” (Groenland 
and Veldhoven, 1983). This knowledge is considered to 
be important for attitudes towards tax compliance. Song 
and Yarbrough (1978) have included education as a 
background variable in their experiment.  
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They find that those with more fiscal knowledge had more 
positive tax ethics scores (attitudes towards tax com-
pliance will be discussed below) than those with lower 
fiscal knowledge. Eriksen and Fallan (1996) also find that 
specific tax knowledge was positively linked to taxpayer 
attitude. The study conducted by Chan et al. (2000) 
reveal that higher education is directly linked to an 
increased likelihood of tax compliance. By using 
randomized response technique for a mail questionnaire 
survey of Australian individuals, Houston and Tran (2001) 
also find that taxpayers without tertiary education tend to 
have lower proportions of tax compliance than their coun-
terparts with tertiary education. In addition, Richardson 
(2006) also reports that general education level is 
significantly related to tax evasion.  
 
 
NON-COMPLIANCE OPPORTUNITY 
 
In the Fischer model, noncompliance opportunity can 
affect taxpayer compliance directly through income level, 
income source and occupation and indirectly through 
attitudes and perceptions.  
 
 
Income level 
 
Almost all the theoretical model indicates that as income 
rises, tax evasions should increase over most ranges 
(Andreoni et al., 1998). Vogel (1974) finds that 
respondents who report an improvement in individual 
financial/income status during the past 5 years are more 
likely to commit tax evasion than those who report a 
deterioration of their financial/income status during the 
same period. Houston and Tran (2001) also reveal the 
respondents in the lower income group tend to have a 
lower proportion of tax compliance by under-reporting 
income and by over-claiming expenses than their 
counterparts in the higher income group. By investigating 
participants in the 1997 Arkansas Tax penalty amnesty 
program, Ritsema et al. (2003) also find that income level 
is positively related to the tax owed. 
 
 
Income source 
 
Tax payers vary in terms of the opportunities available to 
them to overstating expenses and understating incomes. 
Greater tax noncompliance opportunity is generally 
resulted from self-employment and income sources not 
subject to withholding taxes. In one of the first tax 
compliance studies, Groves (1958) argues that income 
source has a significant impact on tax compliance.  
Surveys by Aitken and Bonneville (1980) and Groenland 
and Voldhoven (1983) find that taxpayers who are self-
employed are more likely to commit various forms of tax 
non-compliance. Houston and Tran (2001)  also  reveal  a  
 
 
 
 
significantly higher proportion of tax evasion among 
respondents who are self-employed. In addition Vogel 
(1974) also reveals that 39% of Swedish respondents 
who acknowledged receiving additional income that was 
not taxable at the source also committed evading taxes in 
comparison with 21% of those acknowledging no such 
additional income. Based on the poll tax in Tanzania, 
Fjeldstad and Semboja (2001) find support for differences 
in opportunities for tax noncompliance. “Employees pay-
ing their head-tax through a tax withholding system have 
fewer opportunities to evade than the self-employed” 
(Fjeldstad and Semboja, 2001). Richardson (2006) also 
reports that income source is significantly related to tax 
evasion.  
 
 
Occupation 
 
This refers to an individual’s employment or earnings 
activity (Jackson and Milliron, 1986). Sutherland (1949) 
argues that tax evasion is considered as a white-collar 
crime, committed by an individual of respectability and 
high social status in the course of performing his 
employment. In addition, TCMP data also indicate that 
“among all sole proprietors those who engaged in sales 
from fixed locations (car dealerships, stores, restaurants 
etc) understated taxes by the greatest percentage” 
(Andreoni et al., 1998). 
 
 
ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS 
 
The Fischer model suggests 2 major considerations for 
altering taxpayers’ attitudes and perceptions to tax 
compliance are the fairness of the tax system and peer 
influence. 
 
 
Fairness of tax system 
 
It is widely believed by tax administrators and the 
taxpayers that growing dissatisfaction with the fairness of 
tax system is the major causes for increasing tax non-
compliance. Tax fairness consists of at least 2 different 
dimensions.  “One dimension appears to involve the 
equity of the trade - the benefits received for the tax 
dollars given. The other dimension appears to involve the 
equity of the taxpayer’s burden in reference to that of 
other individuals” Jackson and Milliron (1986, p. 137). 
Thus unfairness of the tax system may reflect taxpayers’ 
perceptions that they are overpaying taxes in relation to 
the value of the services provided by government or in 
relation to what other taxpayers pay.  Porcano (1984) 
finds that taxpayers’ need and ability to pay are the most 
significant variables related to perceptions of fairness of 
the tax system. Other surveys conducted by Scott and 
Grasmick (1982) and Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) indicate 
  
 
 
that respondents who believe that the tax system is unfair 
are more likely to commit tax noncompliance behavior. 
Based on a quasi-experiment with pre-testing and post-
testing of 2 student groups, Eriksen and Fallan (1996) 
also reveal that an important means of ensuring tax 
compliance is to provide more tax knowledge so as to 
improve people’s perception of the fairness of the tax 
system. The study conducted by Richardson (2006) also 
indicates that perceived fairness of tax system is 
significantly related to tax evasion.  
 
 
Peer influence 
 
Peers are usually referred to taxpayers’ associates and 
include friends, relatives and colleagues (Jackson and 
Milliron, 1986). The peer influence is reflected in an 
individual’s expectations in relation to the approval or dis-
approval of that tax noncompliance behavior. Grasmick 
and Scott (1982) indicate that respondents with peers 
who practice tax noncompliance are more likely to com-
mit as well. The survey conducted by Mason et al. (1975) 
finds that people committing tax noncompliance are more 
likely to discuss tax matters with their peers. The study 
conducted by Chan et al. (2000) also reveals that 
taxpayers may still commit noncompliance so long as this 
noncompliance is consistent with in-group expectations 
and norms. 
 
 
TAX SYSTEM/STRUCTURE 
 
It is widely acknowledged that the extent of tax 
compliance in many developing countries has been 
decreasing. The underdeveloped tax system/structure is 
one of the major causes for this phenomenon. In the 
Fischer Model, the effectiveness of tax system is affected 
by complexity of tax system, probability of detection and 
penalties and tax rates.  
 
 
Complexity of tax system 
 
As the tax law has become increasingly complex, 
complexity has come to be recognized as a possible rea-
son for tax noncompliance (Jackson and Milliron, 1986). 
In the context of tax compliance decisions, complexity 
should include 2 dimensions, excessive detail in the tax 
rules and numerous computations required. Taxpayers 
should be able to understand the tax rules for com-
putations by which they are to be taxed. These tax rules 
should aim to be simple, understandable and clear in 
order to enhance tax compliance. In general, complexity 
of tax system should increase as the number of criteria 
specified by tax laws increase. Clotfelter (1983) reveals 
that complexity of tax system has been associated with 
greater underreporting of  tax.  Milliron  (1985)  also  finds 
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that complexity has a significant effect on tax compliance 
decision. Richardson (2006) also reports that tax law 
complexity is significantly related to tax evasion. 
 
 
Probability of detection and penalties 
 
In general, higher audit probabilities and severe penalties 
encourage tax compliance. Probability of detection refers 
to the likelihood that the tax authorities will discover an 
individual’s noncompliance and seek to remedy the 
evasion. Individuals normally would like to evade their tax 
liabilities entirely and the only reason they might not do 
so is that there is some non-zero probability of being 
caught (Massimo, 1993). Raising the probability of 
detection will increase tax compliance and tax audit 
represents one of the effective detective measures used 
by tax authorities (Alm, 1991). In fact, tax audits are 
considered to have both direct deterrent effect on the 
taxpayers actually audited and indirect deterrent effect on 
taxpayers not audited (Alm et al., 2004). Witte and 
Woodbury (1985) find a significant positive relationship 
between the risk of tax audit and the rate of voluntary tax 
compliance. However, the study by Beron et al. (1990) 
reveals that tax audit exert only a modest positive effect 
on tax compliance.   
Another important factor affecting tax compliance is the 
relationship between tax compliance and the severity of 
sanctions. The idea is that fear of penalties prohibits tax 
noncompliance behavior. Establishing an effective system 
to penalize tax evaders is an important measure to en-
courage tax compliance. Taxpayers will be more likely to 
comply if noncompliance may result in severe penalties. 
According to the theoretical work conducted by Allingham 
and Sandmo (1972), tax compliance can be increased by 
increasing the penalties associated with it. To be 
effective, penalties must be applied speedily and 
forcefully. Witte and Woodbury (1985) report a significant 
relationship between the severity of criminal sanctions 
and tax compliance. Other studies by Grasmick and Scott 
(1982) and Tittle (1980) also indicate that respondents 
acknowledging some form of tax noncompliance are less 
likely if such acts would result in severe penalties. The 
experimental studies conducted by Hasseldine et al. 
(2007) also show that severity of sanctions has significant 
effects on tax compliance behavior. 
 
 
Tax rates 
 
The third major construct of tax system/structure in the 
Fischer model is tax rates. Empirical evidence has 
suggested that progressive versus flat tax rate is the 
significant structural variable in association with tax 
compliance behavior (Clotfelter, 1983). Research using 
experiments typically find that high tax rates are linked to 
less   tax   compliance  (Friedland et al., 1978). Using  the  
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Figure 2. Modified fisher et al. (1992) tax compliance model. 
 
 
 
audited tax returns for individual taxpayers in Jamaica, 
Alm et al. (1993) also reveal that the probability of 
underreporting and the level of underreporting are 
positively related to the marginal tax rate.  
 
 
MODICICATIONS TO FISHER MODEL 
 
The Fischer model provides a framework for 
understanding the influence of those socio-economic and 
psychological components on taxpayers’ compliance 
decision. We suggest a partial refinement to this model 
by incorporating another important environmental factor - 
culture and the interaction effect between noncompliance 
opportunity and tax system/structure on tax compliance 
(Figure 2). We will illustrate this interaction effect by using 
income level and tax rates.   
 
 
Culture 
 
Culture is considered to be a powerful environmental 
factor that affects the taxpayer’s compliance. Different 
social norms and ethical values will create different 
incentives for tax compliance. In fact, ethical values 
influenced by social norms may prohibit taxpayers from 
engaging in tax evasion (Blanthorne and Kaplan, 2008). 
The cultural framework most widely used is that of 
Hofstede (1980). Based on an attitude survey of about 
116,000 IBN employees, Hofstede identifies 4 underlying 
societal values; individualism, power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance and masculinity. Cultural research has found 
significant differences between the US and Chinese 
citizens (Hofstede, 1991). Not all cultural dimensions 
affect taxpayers’ compliance. Chan et al. (2000) suggests 
that the cultural dimension affecting tax compliance is 
collectivism and individualism. In Hofstede's model, 
individualism and collectivism refer to the degree of 
interdependence a society maintains among individuals 
(Hofstede, 1991). The cultural dimension of individualism 
relates to the degree of integration a society maintains 
among its members. A high individualism culture is 
signified by people focusing on themselves rather than on 
the group to which they belong. Under this perspective, 
an individual is seen as separable from and independent 
of a group affiliation. People in such low individualism 
culture as Chinese citizens, they tend to be collectivists 
who are expected to follow and subscribe to the values of 
their in-groups in order to gain peer acceptance and 
social status (Hofstede, 1991). In contrast, a high indivi-
dualism culture such as US citizens is signified by people 
focusing on themselves rather than on the group to which 
they belong. Under this perspective, they view 
themselves as distinct entities and place great value on 
individual rights. These cultural differences may have a 
direct impact on ethical values and moral development 
and ultimately affecting tax compliance decisions. The 
study conducted by Chan et al. (2000) indicates that 
culture of the taxpayers has an impact on taxpayer 
compliance efforts. 
  
 
 
Interaction effect between income level and tax rates 
 
Income level and tax rates are found to be negatively 
related to tax-compliance (Andreoni et al., 1998; Houston 
and Tran, 2001). Further, these 2 variables may jointly 
have a negative interaction effect (that is, 2 variables 
considered together), which is over and above that of 
their individual impact, on tax compliance. A taxpayer with 
high income and high tax rates would have higher 
motivation to be aggressive in tax reporting. The case 
would be more noticeable if the taxpayer is facing a 
progressive tax system. On the other hand, a taxpayer 
with high income but low tax rates would have lower 
motivation to be aggressive in tax reporting. 
 
 
Conclusions and suggestions for future research 
 
This paper summarizes extant research on the tax 
compliance determinants based on Fischer’s model. This 
synthesis should be of interest to academic researchers 
as identifying the tax compliance determinants and resol-
ving tax compliance problems could provide challenging 
research opportunities in taxation. Despite the many 
studies as discussed above, much work remains to be 
done if we would like to develop fully understanding of 
this intrinsically complex subject and the means of 
promoting tax compliance. Based on the syntheses of 
research on tax compliance, our conclusions about those 
gaps on tax compliance determinants studies and areas 
for future research are as follows 
As discussed above, existing research provides 
insights into the different components of Fischer’s model 
without investigating their inter-relationship.  Additional 
theory-building research to further extend Fisher model 
might be worthwhile. To be of practical relevance, such 
research should concentrate on identifying and under-
standing variables and their inter-relationship that act as 
key determinants of tax compliance.  
Extant literature on the compliance including both 
analytical and empirical studies mainly focused on 
individual noncompliance. There is little or no research on 
corporate tax noncompliance. Greater attention should be 
paid to the complex corporate noncompliance. This area 
is of considerable significance for the function of fair tax 
systems between individuals and corporations.   
Tax compliance research conducted so far is mainly 
focused on developed countries. In view of the inade-
quacies in the institutional framework and insufficient ex-
pertise and resources to monitor the intricacies of the tax 
compliance problems, developing countries are particu-
larly vulnerable to tax noncompliance. There is an urgent 
need for more empirical and institutional research on the 
tax compliance behaviors in developing countries. 
A final issue that warrants attention is the effect of 
culture on tax compliance. Although the tax compliance 
research in other cultures other than the Anglo-Saxon 
countries could provide insight into the cultural effects  on  
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tax compliance behavior; little work has been done on 
comparative tax compliance under different cultural 
environments. In fact different cultures will create different 
incentives and opportunities for tax compliance or 
evasion. Thus future work needs to incorporate cultural 
dimensions into tax compliance research. In addition, 
research based on a greater longitudinal emphasis could 
also be carried out so as to assess the impact of changes 
on cultural dimensions. 
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